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1431 
A REPORTER KEEPING CONFIDENCES: MORE 
IMPORTANT THAN EVER 
David Rudenstine* 
 
This much is agreed upon: the press is essential to self-
government.  It informs the people, and thus contributes to assuring 
government accountability to the people, whose informed vote is crucial 
to conferring legitimacy on the self-governing enterprise.  After that 
there is only debate over the role of the press in our democracy, and that 
debate is particularly acrimonious when it focuses on the subject of this 
symposium—namely, the degree to which the law should protect 
reporters from having to divulge confidential sources upon which their 
reports depend, or suffer judicially imposed sanctions, such as 
imprisonment, as the price they must pay for keeping a promise of 
confidentiality. 
The debate over what we popularly term the reporter’s privilege is 
hardly a recent development.  In perhaps the first reported case, John 
Nugent, a reporter for the New York Herald, went to jail in 1848 rather 
than disclose to Congress the name of the individual who gave him a 
secret draft treaty with Mexico.1  At the other end of the historical 
continuum, Judith Miller, a reporter for the New York Times, went to 
prison for eighty-five days in 2005 rather than identify her source to the 
Valerie Plame special prosecutor, Patrick Fitzgerald.2  These two 
moments, separated by 157 years, highlight the durability of the debate 
over the right of a reporter to keep confidential a source’s identity, an 
issue over which contemporary scholars, commentators, law makers, 
reporters, and editors not only continue to disagree, but disagree 
vigorously.  This disagreement runs deep and broad, and includes many 
 
 *  David Rudenstine is the Dean of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University as well as the Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law.  He wishes to acknowledge the 
assistance of Andrew Kurland and Laura Barandes in preparing this essay for publication. 
 1 Stephen Bates, The Reporter’s Privilege, Then and Now 2 (The Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on 
the Press, Pol., & Pub. Pol’y, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Research Paper R-
23, 2000), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/ 
research_papers/R23.pdf; see also DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY: CONGRESS AND THE 
WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS 28-29 (1991). 
 2 Don Van Natta Jr., Adam Liptak & Clifford J. Levy, The Miller Case: A Notebook, a 
Cause, a Jail Cell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1; Max Frankel, The Washington 
Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 25, 2007, at 40. 
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specific issues such as whether the privilege should be absolute or 
qualified; whether the privilege should be protected by the Constitution 
or a statute or the federal courts should base a reporter’s privilege on 
federal common law; and whether the privilege belongs to the reporter 
or the source. 
The issue of a reporter’s privilege sweeps broadly across the work 
of reporters.  For example, the issue may arise in a libel case in which 
an injured party wishes to sue not only a reporter and a newspaper, but 
the source, who contributed to the alleged libelous report and whose 
identity a reporter refuses to disclose.3  Or it may arise when a grand 
jury investigating a crime demands that a reporter identify the source of 
a news report on the assumption that the source may have committed an 
underlying crime or knows the identity of a person who did.4 
Although there is little doubt that the news reports resulting in libel 
actions or grand jury investigations are important to keep the public 
informed, there is also no doubt that such reports generally pale in 
comparison to the public’s need to be informed about national security 
matters.  These issues, which include military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence matters, are directly relevant to the nation’s security and 
liberty, vital to the democratic process, and extremely difficult for the 
public to be informed about. 
Since the end of World War II, two trends have combined to make 
it difficult for the public to be informed about important national 
security issues.  First, during the last sixty years, the executive branch 
has accumulated enormous power over military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence matters.5  It has done so for many reasons including the fact 
that the Constitution grants the executive certain responsibilities and 
powers; the pyramidal structure of the executive culminating in the 
presidency encourages the accumulation of power and responsibility in 
the President’s two hands as opposed to the hundreds of hands of the 
Congress; Congress has, with few exceptions, ceded power to the 
executive at its own expense;6  and the federal courts have adopted such 
 
 3 Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Privileged? 
(Apr. 23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1353 (2008). 
 4 Id. at 1357. 
 5 See generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ JR. & 
AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 
(2007); MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCHECKED & 
UNBALANCED (2007). 
 6 Robert M. Pallitto and William G. Weaver explain: “Legislation in the national security 
area is a classic example of what Theodore Lowi calls ‘legiscide,’ where Congress grants power 
and then ineffectively tries to take it back, one little bit at a time.”  ROBERT M. PALLITTO & 
WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 18 (2007) (quoting Theodore J. 
Lowi, Presidential Democracy in America: Toward the Homogenized Regime, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 
401, 403 (1994)). 
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a deferential attitude toward the executive branch in cases involving 
military, diplomatic, and intelligence matters that they not only 
permitted but facilitated the emergence of the executive as the 
overwhelmingly dominant power in contemporary American 
government.7  As a result, the executive exercises enormous control 
over what the public knows about national security matters. 
Second, this enormous shift of responsibility and power to the 
executive over national security matters has been accompanied by a 
parallel trend that dramatically enhances the seriousness of the danger 
created by the current imbalance of power.  That parallel trend has 
witnessed the increasing secret exercise of executive national security 
power.8  Thus, since 9/11, the executive has, without public disclosure 
and debate, engaged in eavesdropping on United States citizens, 
monitored international banking transactions, tortured individuals 
subject to executive detention, executed signing statements to disavow 
the executive’s duty to faithfully execute the laws, and authorized 
renditions—the extraordinary practice of kidnapping and shipping a 
suspected terrorist to a nation state such as Syria or Egypt—where the 
suspect will be tortured.9  The coupling of enormous power in the hands 
of the executive branch and its exercise in secret presents a direct threat 
to the capacity of the people to hold the executive accountable and eats 
away at the foundation of the democratic process that confers 
legitimacy on the governing process. 
It is within this overall context in which the allocation of power is 
greatly distorted and then exercised behind closed doors that the need to 
protect confidential sources in national security reporting must be 
assessed.  It is widely assumed—and it is an assumption that I do not 
believe can be convincingly challenged—that no meaningful national 
security reporting would exist without confidential sources.10  This is 
true mainly because almost all information pertinent to national security 
is classified, thus preventing those with lawful access to it from 
revealing it to the press.  It is only because some individuals do make 
such information public that we have access to it. 
Thus, in recent years, it is the press that has disclosed to the 
public—indeed, on occasion, even to the Congress—secret and highly 
controversial executive orders, programs, and actions taken by the 
executive in the name of national security.  These reports certainly 
 
 7 In essence, “the president almost always seems to win foreign affairs.”  HAROLD HONGJU 
KOH, Why The President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: The Problem of Judicial 
Tolerance, in THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 134, 148 (1990). 
 8 See generally PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 6. 
 9 See SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 5, at 97-123. 
 10 Max Frankel, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Privileged? (Apr. 
23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1360, 1361 (2008).  
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provide important information to the people.  They also hold out the 
hope that Congress will reclaim at least some of the important 
responsibility and authority it has ceded to the President in national 
security matters.  In addition, there is even reason to believe that these 
news reports have prompted the federal judiciary to reconsider the 
assumptions underlying its traditional deference towards the executive 
in national security cases and to fashion doctrines that require some 
accountability of the executive to the courts in the name of the 
Constitution.  Thus, as the role of the press in checking the executive on 
national security issues has become crucial, the resolution of the precise 
and narrow question of a reporter’s right to keep the identity of sources 
confidential becomes extremely critical because there will be no 
meaningful national security reporting absent confidential sources. 
At a symposium held at Cardozo during the spring of 2007, 
Anthony Lewis, Max Frankel, and Victor Kovner—three lions in the 
press and legal circles—addressed the question of whether reporters 
should be privileged and, if so, to what extent.  Following the 
symposium, three legal scholars—Professors Eric M. Freedman and 
Joel M. Gora and Dean Rodney A. Smolla—accepted the invitation of 
the Cardozo Law Review to submit essays commenting on the 
symposium presentations.  My short essay is intended to introduce the 
subject, the symposium’s transcript, and the essays. 
 
I.     LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The contemporary legal context began to take shape in 1972 when, 
in Branzburg v. Hayes,11 the Supreme Court first addressed the question 
of whether the First Amendment to the Constitution protected newsmen 
from having to appear, to testify, and to disclose the identity of 
confidential sources before state or federal grand juries.  In an opinion 
written by Associate Justice Bryon White on behalf of a five Justice 
majority, the Court concluded that requiring newsmen to appear, testify, 
and disclose confidential sources before a state or federal grand jury did 
not abridge the First Amendment, provided that the grand jury 
investigation was instituted and conducted in good faith and did not 
constitute harassment of the press.12  Justice Douglas dissented on the 
ground that the First Amendment protected a newsman from appearing 
or testifying before a grand jury, “unless the reporter himself is 
implicated in a crime,”13 in which case “the Fifth Amendment stands as 
 
 11 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 12 Id. at 667. 
 13 Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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a barrier.”14  Justice Stewart wrote the main dissent, which was joined 
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, in which he concluded that: 
[W]hen a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal 
confidences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that 
there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information 
that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) 
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by 
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) 
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the 
information.15 
If these three opinions were the only opinions in Branzburg, the 
case’s guiding legal rule would not have been uncertain.  But Justice 
Powell, who voted with the majority and actually concurred in White’s 
opinion, submitted an opinion that confused the legal meaning of the 
Court’s ruling.16 
In what can only described as an inaccurate description of Justice 
White’s sweeping ruling, Justice Powell stated in his opening line that 
he wished to emphasize the “limited nature of the Court’s holding.”17  
To make matters worse, he stated in his very next sentence—and he did 
this even though it seemed that Justice White had denied that the First 
Amendment provided protection to reporters who sought to protect the 
identity of their sources—that the “Court does not hold that newsmen 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional 
rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their 
sources.”18  If Justice Powell meant to offer reporters renewed hope by 
his opening sentences, he quickly deflated it in a few others that simply 
repeated Justice White’s qualification that grand jury investigations 
must be conducted in good faith and that harassment of newsmen will 
not be tolerated.  But it was precisely at that part of his opinion that 
Justice Powell turned momentary clarity into decades of uncertainty.  
Powell wrote: 
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing 
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his 
testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a 
legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court 
on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be 
entered.  The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts 
by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and 
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 16 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
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to criminal conduct.  The balance of these vital constitutional and 
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and 
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.19 
According to Powell—and only Powell—a newsman will be 
protected by the First Amendment when testifying before a grand jury if 
asked to provide information that has “only a remote and tenuous 
relationship to the subject of the investigation,”20 or “if he has some 
other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source 
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement.”21  As is 
plain, Justice Powell’s reasoning is at odds with Justice White’s and in 
some respects provides even more protection to a reporter than the 
dissenting opinion written by Justice Stewart.  But Justice Powell’s 
contributions to legal uncertainty in this important case went further.  
He added the assertion that a reporter’s claim of privilege should be 
“judged on its facts”22 on a case-by-case basis “striking of a proper 
balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens 
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”23 
Powell’s opinion in Branzburg left the law in a muddle.  Powell 
left it unclear whether a reporter had a right based on the Constitution to 
protect his confidential source.  He did not clarify whether the 
protection for reporters he spelled out in his concurrence was based on 
the Constitution or on the common law.  He failed to make clear 
whether the privilege he sought to protect belonged to a reporter or a 
source.  He did not identify the factors he believed a judge should 
consider and weigh in deciding whether or not to protect a reporter’s 
source.  He did not state whether he thought some values or 
considerations should be weighed more heavily than others as a judge 
engages in the balancing exercise Powell prescribed. 
Even Justice Stewart could not resist poking fun at the uncertainty 
and confusion Justice Powell’s enigmatic opinion created.  Justice 
Stewart wrote: 
In the cases involving the newspaper reporters’ claims that they had 
a constitutional privilege not to disclose their confidential news 
sources to a grand jury, the Court rejected the claims by a vote of 
five to four, or, considering Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, 
perhaps by a vote of four and a half to four and a half.24 
Reporters have attempt to exploit Branzburg’s uncertainty in 
seeking protection in the lower federal courts on either Constitutional or 
common law grounds, and in lobbying Congress to adopt a federal 
 
 19 Id. at 710. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975). 
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shield law.  In addition, reporters and their supporters have successfully 
used the specific defeat in Branzburg to persuade state legislatures to 
adopt state shield laws.  The result is that today reporters are broadly 
protected around the country by state law, but not federal law.  As a 
result, the important outstanding issue is whether reporters—in national 
security, libel or ordinary criminal cases—will eventually enjoy a 
qualified statutory or common law privilege at the federal level and, if 
so, what the specific qualifications will be. 
 
II.     THE SYMPOSIUM 
 
It is against this legal background, and the increasing efforts by 
lawyers and courts to force reporters to disclose their confidential 
sources, that this symposium occurred.  Three exceptionally 
distinguished individuals—Anthony Lewis, Max Frankel, and Victor 
Kovner—each presented a compelling perspective on the question of a 
reporter’s privilege.  Although they have had long and nationally 
important careers and share a perspective that emphasizes the enormous 
significance of the press in making government accountable, the 
differences among them on the question of the privilege was 
breathtaking. 
The transcript of the remarks made by Mr. Lewis, Mr. Frankel, and 
Mr. Kovner is followed by three essays written by long-time students of 
the law of the press: Joel M. Gora, Eric M. Freedman, and Rodney A. 
Smolla.  Although these three individuals also place great value on the 
role of the press in making government accountable, they do not agree 
on the question of a reporter’s privilege any more than the symposium 
presenters. 
As a whole, the transcript and the essays explore the essential 
questions: Does the United States Constitution guarantee reporters a 
privilege? Is there a federal common law based privilege? Should 
Congress adopt a statutory privilege? Should a privilege be absolute or 
qualified? Does the privilege belong to the reporter or to the source? If 
the privilege is qualified, what protection should a qualified privilege 
provide? Who is a reporter? Needless to say, the transcript and the 
essays do not offer timeless and definitive answers to these bedeviling 
questions.  But they do illuminate them by defining the competing 
values and interests that make the issues so controversial and important. 
In elegant and eloquent words, Anthony Lewis reminds us that, on 
the one hand, the “press does not always have right and justice on its 
side,”25 and that, on the other hand, the “press, with all its defects of 
 
 25 Lewis, supra note 3, at 1353. 
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haste and short attention span, is often the only defense against abuse of 
power.”26  In considering the scope of privilege the law should accord to 
reporters, Mr. Lewis relies most heavily on cases in which an 
individual’s reputation has been wrongfully harmed by the press which 
subsequently resists the disclosure of a source who may have been 
responsible for disseminating false and harmful information.  Although 
Mr. Lewis’s use of an injured individual engenders sympathy for 
denying reporters wholesale protection of confidential sources, Mr. 
Lewis is plainly cognizant of the fact that confidential sources are 
absolutely essential to “[t]he most important press disclosures [which] 
have had to do with what the government says is national security: the 
Pentagon Papers case, warrantless wiretapping, secret CIA prisons.”27 
Mr. Lewis states that he has no “simple answer to the problem of 
protecting needed press confidentiality”28 and that he does not “believe 
that there is a bright-line rule that will satisfy both society’s interest in a 
strong press and its interest in justice.”29  As a result, Mr. Lewis claims 
that he is “driven, in the end, to a reliance on judges to balance those 
interests.”30  In other words, because Mr. Lewis holds no hope that 
Congress will adopt a shield law that will provide adequate protection to 
the press, he turns to the federal judiciary to develop a common law 
evidentiary privilege that balances the competing interests and shapes a 
privilege that provides some protection to journalists and allows them to 
report fully on important national security matters. 
Max Frankel does not share Anthony Lewis’s faith in the capacity 
of the judiciary to assess the competing interests that arise when courts 
are asked to coerce reporters into disclosing their sources.  In 
illustrating his perspective, Mr. Frankel uses national security as 
opposed to libel, which he terms as a “red-herring”31 in any effort to 
define the scope of  a reporter’s privilege, as the context in which he 
assesses the issues.  From his perspective, the nation’s security is 
protected by the disclosure of national security secrets as it is by 
maintaining them.  Mr. Frankel puts the issue in refreshingly forthright 
language: 
A reporter covering the Pentagon, the CIA, foreign affairs and wars 
simply cannot function unless a large number of officials from the 
President on down—for both noble and vile reasons—are willing to 
talk about those secrets on a confidential basis.  The price of learning 
about . . . these awful renditions of prisoners around the world and of 
torture that we engage in has to be paid by also allowing the Libbys 
 
 26 Id. at 1354. 
 27 Id. at 1357. 
 28 Id. at 1358. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Frankel, supra note 10 at 1361. 
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of this world to pass secrets for less noble reasons. 
  The only way that reporting can continue to function in this realm 
of national security is if the law takes care not to legislate the nature 
of the relationship between the press and its sources.32 
Mr. Frankel argues that the scope of disclosure surrounding 
national security secrets is a “political contest”33 which has taken on its 
current character since the rise of the “garrison state”34 at the onset of 
the cold war to which the “law has no answer.”35  It is a “contest”36 
among the sources, government officials, the press, and the law that 
amounts to “combat”37 in which the “government tries to protect its 
secrets”38 while the press tries to “ferret them out,”39 and, at the same 
time, persuade the public that its publication decisions are in their 
interest, and therefore deserve to be legally protected.  
Victor Kovner, a nationally prominent press lawyer, believes that 
there is a “real opportunity”40 during the fall of 2007, that Congress will 
adopt a qualified privilege for reporters that President George W. Bush 
will endorse.  Mr. Kovner further believes that a federal statutory shield 
law will have a “carve out”41 for national security issues, meaning that 
the qualified shield will be unavailable to reporters protecting sources in 
national security news reports.  In addition, Mr. Kovner thinks that in 
the absence of the adoption of a statutory privilege the federal courts 
“are well on the road”42 to establishing a federal common law qualified 
privilege for reporters.  Mr. Kovner is uncertain whether Congress or 
the courts will act first, but he is certain that “we’re going to get [a 
qualified privilege] one way or the other.”43 
The three essays following the transcript are as varied as the 
presentations by Mr. Lewis, Mr. Frankel, and Mr. Kovner.  In 
unqualified terms, Professor Eric M. Freedman favors an absolute 
privilege for reporters.44  Professor Joel M. Gora, whose personal 
history made him both a participant in the struggles involving a 
reporter’s privilege and an academic observer, reviews the thirty-five 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 1362. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Victor Kovner, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Privileged? (Apr. 
23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2008). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1368. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Eric M. Freedman, Reconstructing Journalists’ Privilege, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1381 
(2008). 
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years since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Branzburg case with 
puzzlement, if not frustration, as to the meaning of the struggles ignited 
by Justice White’s “distressing” opinion and Justice Powell’s enigmatic 
concurrence.45  Contrary to Professor Freedman, Dean Rodney A. 
Smolla favors the extension of a qualified “newsgathering privilege”46 
and sets forth five “principles”47 that he suggests should “inform the 
creation of a federal shield,”48 and “guide the federal judiciary in its 
interpretation of such a shield law.”49 
Although substantial distance separates the different positions 
taken by the three presenters and the three essayists, there is, 
nonetheless, a less visible, subterranean shelf upon which they all stand 
as they pursue separate paths through the more visible contemporary 
political and legal thicket.  That important common ground is that the 
quality of our politically accountable democratic process requires that 
those who gather and report our news be able to protect at least some 
sources in some contexts.  These six commentators do not agree as to 
how much protection must be afforded confidential sources to assure 
that our politically accountable democratic process remains 
meaningfully vital and responsive, but all of them assume that the their 
position would reinforce those democratic values.  Moreover, not one of 
them suggests that a certain category of confidential sources should be 
consistently disclosed if such disclosure would directly injure or slowly 
undermine the capacity of reporters to report the news that is vital to 
assuring that government is meaningfully accountable to the people. 
 
III.     FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
In concluding, let me draw your attention to the views of two 
Supreme Court Justices whose approach to interpreting the Constitution 
differed sharply, but who shared a notable commitment to a free press.  
The quotations are drawn from separate opinions submitted in the 
Pentagon Papers case50 in which the Nixon administration sought to 
restrain the press from publishing excerpts from a top-secret, Pentagon 
history of America’s involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968.  
Although each opinion constitutes a powerful endorsement of the 
important role of the press in a democratic system, the differences 
 
 45 Joel M. Gora, The Source of the Problem of Sources: The First Amendment Fails, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1399 (2008).  
 46 Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in 
“Reverse Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2008) 
 47 Id. at 1429-30. 
 48 Id. at 1429. 
 49 Id. 
 50 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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between them are as striking and as important as their similarity. 
After lamenting the failure of the Congress and the Courts to check 
the accretion and exercise of power by the President, Justice Stewart 
wrote: 
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in 
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon 
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and 
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an 
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the 
values of democratic government.  For this reason, it is perhaps here 
that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic 
purpose of the first amendment.  For without an informed and free 
press there cannot be an enlightened people.51 
Stewart valued the press as a medium for passing along 
information to the public.  The particular importance of the function—
the press informing the public—might, from Stewart’s perspective, be 
more or less important depending upon how effectively the Congress 
and the courts checked and held the executive accountable.  Thus, for 
Stewart, there was nothing about how the government inherently 
functioned that made the Congress and the courts only partially 
adequate in holding the executive accountable.  In other words, for 
Stewart, the system might work so well in checking and balancing 
power at the highest levels that the press might not have a central role as 
an antidote to checking the executive’s potential abuse of power. 
Justice Black had a fundamentally different perspective, and went 
much further than Justice Stewart in developing a rationale for strong 
press freedoms.  Black certainly agreed with Stewart that the Congress 
and the courts performed important functions in checking the executive 
and holding it accountable.  But Black believed that more—and in his 
mind, the press was that “more”—was required to check the executive 
and hold it accountable. 
Black gave voice to his views in the last opinion he ever wrote, 
which was his concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case.  In that 
opinion, Justice Black returned to themes and values that are central 
pillars of his judicial legacy, and wrote words that are as poignant today 
as they were the day he penned them, at a time when they resonated 
with the public because of war in Vietnam. 
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the 
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.  
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.  The 
Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government.  The 
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government 
 
 51 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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and inform the people.  Only a free and unrestrained press can 
effectively expose deception in government.  And paramount among 
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of 
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to 
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.52 
In Black’s view, the Congress and the courts were insufficient 
because the government lies and it lies to the public about important 
matters.  Moreover, Black assumed that the government vigorously 
seeks to protect its lies from being disclosed by camouflaging them in 
the garb of national security and then concealing them from the public.  
Of course, Black accepted that some national security secrets should 
remain secret.  But he also believed that much information was 
classified and that many secrets were secrets merely to protect the 
government from embarrassment and inconvenience.  Black did not 
trust the Congress and the courts to bare these secrets, and whatever 
misgivings he may have had regarding the press (and he surely had 
some), he had no choice but to look to the press to bare these secrets to 
protect the people from governmental lies and deception. 
As a society, we must resolve the issues surrounding a reporter’s 
privilege.  And yet, so many of the normative claims—though surely 
not all53—relevant to deciding the scope of protection a reporter should 
be afforded in protecting a source cannot be empirically assessed with 
precision.  Rather these claims rest on complicated political, social, and 
economic factors not reliably quantified or calculated.  It is within this 
context of fundamental values and assumptions regarding government 
and the exercise of its power that we must decide the narrow question of 
a reporter’s privilege.  In doing so, we are, whether we recognize it or 
not, assessing our willingness to trust our free institutions to make us 
strong, our capacity to perceive danger in measures promoted allegedly 
to advance security, and our collective commitment to individual liberty 
and vital democracy within the rule of law.  In the end, so much of what 
we decide about these profound issues, including our willingness to 
protect reporters, depends on the depth of convictions to our most basic 
political values— upon nothing less than our democratic faith. 
 
 52 Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). 
 53 As noted supra, “There would be no meaningful national security reporting absent 
confidential sources.” 
